ABSTRACT The twenty-first century's security environment has triggered a phenomenon of 'proliferation' of intelligence and security cooperation, both domestically and internationally. After the ousting of the communist regime (whose intelligence system served the regime) in 1989, Romania embarked upon democratic reform of its new intelligence system (including strengthening cooperation), to better tackle the current security challenges. This has been a rather onerous process, yet worthwhile: Romania's intelligence is presently cooperating well with national and international partners, to counter national, regional, and global security threats. This paper assesses Romania's efforts in developing intelligence cooperation, after the demise of the communist regime.
Introduction
Although not an outcome of the end of the cold war, cooperation in the realm of intelligence, both nationally and internationally, has evolved significantly since the fall of the Iron Curtain. The twenty-first century's security environment is variegated, unpredictable and extremely dynamic. Poverty, corruption, isolation of minorities, failed states, organized crime, terrorism, pandemic disease, natural disasters, climate change are but a few security dangers, which not only are in a perpetual transformation, but are also interlocking and overlapping, showing how volatile the boundaries between these menaces are. 1 The geographic borders between countries are no longer fixed, although this is what terrorists may want the governments to think: the actual borders are 'delineated' by terrorist activities, organized crime and money laundering.
It is difficult for governments, even if possessing superb intelligence collection and analysis assets, to fight these threats, without adjusting and cooperating. Despite the United States' unparalleled defense and intelligence capabilities, the lack of coordination and cooperation among security agencies, as well as superficial international cooperation, resulted in the intelligence 'failure' of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.
2 Terrorist groups are complex, easily adjustable networks, which governments are not; to effectively avert current threats, government institutions (including intelligence) need to become less 'adiabatic' and more cooperative and flexible. 3 It was the cooperation of British intelligence and law enforcement organizations that led to the prevention of the 'liquid bomb' terrorist threat in August 2006. Grappling with such complex dangers requires more coordination and information sharing at the national level (i.e. among intelligence, law enforcement, and judiciary), establishing partnerships with civil society, and enhancing cooperation with other nations' intelligence communities, yet without endangering or disclosing intelligence agencies' sources and methods, used to accomplish either their shared or distinct goals. To this end, concepts such as 'interagency cooperation', 'intelligence sharing', 'need to share versus need to know', 'intelligence partnerships', 'collective/ cooperative security', and 'security is everyone's business', have become pointers for national security strategies, intelligence reform, education, training and doctrines, as well as international alliances, as an attempt to fill in a gap resulting from the post-cold war transition from a 'puzzle intelligence' (visualizing the answers) to a 'mystery intelligence' (not knowing or visualizing the answers).
Traumatic terrorist attacks in the US (2001), Spain (2004) , and the UK (2005) created a sense of urgency to reform intelligence, create networks and share intelligence (including cooperation with foreign counterparts), in order to avoid future failures. As in other transformation endeavors, the process of instituting and strengthening interagency cooperation has been cumbersome: domestically, information sharing between national intelligence agencies continues to be restricted; internationally, the information/intelligence flow is seldom equal, nor have all intelligence sharing and cooperative efforts been equally welcomed by nations. Notwithstanding, the increase in intelligence sharing and cooperation since 9/11 has been responsible for successful outcomes in the war against terrorism. Intelligence cooperation is not a new concept for Romania's intelligence system either, but its purpose, after the demise of the communist regime, is different: it shifted from ensuring the security of the regime (to the detriment of the population) to the security of the country (in the service of the population). It is very well known that Romania's communist intelligence apparatus (the Securitate) collaborated with the military and/or other components of the police, as well as with international organized crime and terrorism groups (including the cold war terrorist Carlos 'the Jackal'), in order to achieve its pernicious goals against Romanians. But today, the Romanian intelligence community (IC) understands that 'security is everyone's business' and cooperates with its national and international partners to fight the national, regional and global security threats. Romania is at the beginning of such cooperative process.
This paper assesses Romania's intelligence domestic and international cooperative endeavors after the end of communism in 1989 and transition to democracy. There is little in-depth information on how cooperation works (i.e. with regard to collection or analysis) to enable researchers to properly quantify said cooperation, but given the available information, one could argue that the intelligence system has slowly progressed toward a working community.
Romanian Intelligence Community Cooperation Efforts: Per Aspera ad Astra
The Need for Cooperation: Current Threats to Romania's Security Romania is currently confronting dangers deriving from poverty, corruption, neighboring failed states, organized crime, terrorism, pandemic disease, natural disasters and others. It does not have a 'direct' Muslim threat (as does the US or UK) since, on the one hand, the Muslim/Arab population in Romania is better integrated in the society than in other countries, and, on the other hand, there is a warm relationship between Romania and Arab and Muslim world going back to the cold war. Even so, Romania's friendly relations with the US, the implementation of the 2005 Treaty on relocation of US military bases in Romania in late 2007 and the participation of the Romanian troops in the war on terrorism and peace operations could make Romania a target.
Romania unquestionably needs a concerted mechanism of intelligence, law enforcement and judicial efforts to cope with these threats. Likewise, Romania's IC needs to contribute, together with other nations to the regional and global security. 
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Intelligence and National Security Even with a rather solid legal framework for cooperation, developing security cooperation in Romania has been an onerous process, due to agencies' bureaucratic environment (which hinders information sharing and collaboration), too many intelligence agencies (which fueled dishonest competition and rivalry among agencies, because of redundancy and overlapping roles and missions) and agencies' politicization. Besides, creating a National Intelligence Community (CNI) was delayed for years due to Romania's confrontational politics (constant fights between the president and prime minister with regard to lion's share of security and intelligence matters, a consequence of the semi-presidential system), the reluctance of heads of intelligence agencies (which feared that a law on CNI would impose specific constraints on their roles and missions), and the public's fear of a 'return of the Securitate' (caused by the continuity of former Securitate personnel in all intelligence services after 1989).
Regardless of these challenges, Romania's intelligence agencies have been working toward becoming a community, acting jointly to prevent and counter national security dangers. Although the intelligence agencies are entitled by the legislation listed above to receive information from all public and private institutions, additional bilateral and multilateral cooperation protocols have been established to deepen cooperation and coordination among intelligence agencies and other organizations dealing with security issues.
5 Based on these agreements, the intelligence agencies (and other security institutions) have been exchanging and sharing information, assisting each other with personnel, education and training, and participating in field operations together. To expedite intelligence sharing, an Integrated Information System (SII) was created in 2003 within SRI, a gigantic storage center of data gathered from all state institutions. Despite civil society's blistering criticism (due to the lack of transparency of SII's legal framework and lack of control mechanisms), SII has eased information sharing, in that it made possible instant access to certain data. 6 The unitary coordination of Romania's security activity is ensured by the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT), composed of the president, the prime minister, the minister of industry and trade, the minister of defense, the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of interior, the head of the Political Analysis Department of the Presidency, the SRI/SIE directors, and the chief of staff. CSAT coordinates the actions of all security institutions, informs and advises the president on national security and defense issues, produces security-related documents, and integrates all information provided by the intelligence agencies and other national security institutions.
7
CNI -'Apple of Discord' or the 'Gordian Knot' of enhanced interagency cooperation?. On 18 November 2005, CSAT set up Romania's National Intelligence Community, which serves as a supreme coordination body of the activity of all current intelligence agencies, as well as an integrated structure, which provides a centralized processing of intelligence gathered by all its components, and disseminates it to relevant consumers. 8 Although both government and civil society representatives considered the creation of the CNI imperative, it generated a series of controversies and criticism by the prime minister, current and former politicians and public authorities, as well as civil society representatives. The main issue is CNI's flimsy legal basis: critics argue that CNI cannot function without the modification of laws on organization and functioning of CSAT (which does not allow CSAT to set up any structure) on the one hand, and on the CNI components on the other hand (which stipulate the agencies' independence and autonomy versus being part and parcel of a CNI). The lack of parliamentary control of CNI is also problematic. Since it was not explicitly stipulated in the CNI decision, such control does not exist; moreover, the inclusion of members of Parliamentary oversight committees in some of the CNI structures could jeopardize the objectivity of the legislative control/ oversight of each CNI component. Other controversies include: the 6 The Laws on the Integrated Information System (SII) adopted by a CSAT classified resolution were followed by government decision number 952 of August 2003, which was made public (this was needed as the set up of SII would have been impossible otherwise). Ondine Ghergut and Sorin Ghica, 'Legile pentru Sistemul Integrat, secrete de stat', Romania Libera, 23 April 2007. 
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Intelligence and National Security redundancy between CNI and CSAT (i.e. one of CNI's subsidiaries appears to duplicate and even surpass CSAT's attributions); the lack of grounds for including certain members in the CNI subsidiaries (i.e. the minister of foreign affairs and minister of justice, who do not have intelligence services under their subordination); the uncertainty regarding CNI's budget (whether provided by the presidential administration or each intelligence agency); the security clearance (the inclusion of civil society representatives and other experts raise serious issues regarding the observance of Law number 182 of 2002 on access to classified information); and, the apparent increase of the number of intelligence agencies after the creation of the CNI. And, since national security and intelligence have always represented an 'Apple of Discord' between the prime minister and the president, critics view CNI as a 'trick' to increase the president's control over the intelligence services, to the detriment of the prime minister.
9
Despite these problems, the CNI started to function on 7 December 2005, when the Office of Integrated Intelligence was established. It produced the first ten-page intelligence bulletin on 3 January 2006 (comprising raw information and detailed analyses of the issues of importance for the decision makers). Progressively, the daily briefs have been complemented by special syntheses on the development of specific activity pertaining to national security, while dissemination from CSAT members was expanded to parliamentary committees. Through the annual plan of intelligence priorities for intelligence agencies, approved by CSAT, the CNI ensures duplications and overlapping are avoided between CNI and individual briefs from each service.
10
Thus the CNI seems to serve its purpose: increase intelligence agencies' effectiveness and professionalism (by eliminating parallel functions and waste of human and material resources), and generate a functional intelligence partnership (with the agencies preserving their specific roles and missions but enjoying a better coordination of their strategic activities), based on professional versus unfair competition. It is an integrated analysis 'laboratory' rather than an extra intelligence service, as it has no operative attributions. Its coordination through the CSAT (which includes the president, the prime minister and various ministers) reduces the risk of being President Basescu's 'hijacking' of the intelligence agencies. Since CNI needed a statutory law approved by the legislature, a draft CNI law has been under parliament's debate for almost three years (as part of a new national security law package), which stipulates parliamentary control and provides for an increased role for the prime minister in the CNI (i.e. CNI's head would be appointed by the president, at the prime minister's suggestion). Once approved, the law would reduce skepticism toward the CNI.
11
Reaching out to civil society and the general population. Opening toward civil society (the media, think tanks, opinion groups, non-governmental organizations) was perhaps the most difficult cooperative effort undertaken by the intelligence agencies, due to a mutual mistrust between the IC and civil society: IC considered civil society (especially the media) sensationalist and incapable of handling national security information professionally, while civil society considered that the IC did not seriously undertake democratic reform, and lacked transparency and accountability. In spite of a relatively robust legal framework on transparency (to include a Freedom of Information Act), occasionally intelligence agencies would invoke national security for not disclosing information to civil society. Sometimes, even though civil society would win a case to access information, access would still be impossible (as the prosecutor ignored the court order); and even when civil society sued the prosecutor and won, information would not be released until the media got involved. 12 Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have eventually established partnerships with public authorities, academia, NGOs, journalists, etc., to increase their awareness of the need for effective intelligence in Romania, including civil society's involvement in the development of various studies on parliamentary control of intelligence; NGO participation in debating laws pertaining to national security or government transparency; access to IC press releases and websites; the possibility for journalists to interview intelligence officials; participation of NGOs, media and other civil society groups in joint meetings with IC members. In addition, SRI leadership has mentioned the possibility of using the media, NGOs and representatives of academia for prevention of specific national security threats and challenges. Moreover, in compliance with Romania's strategy of combating terrorism, which stipulates cooperation with civil society, the intelligence agencies have established joint programs to train the population on national security. 
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Intelligence and National Security brigade can do to counter these threats, and what the population can do to help the intelligence community avert such threats.
13
Cooperation at the International Level Romania has been interested in cooperating with international partners; particularly joining the European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions, and establishing a partnership with the US. But, at first, cooperation with foreign countries was difficult and Romania remained isolated from the West, as many NATO and Western counterparts were reluctant to share information with IC personnel who had previously worked for the Securitate; one of the grave problems in Romanian IC transition to democracy was the continuation of former Securitate personnel in both the IC and other government positions. NATO/EU more or less ordered Romania to dismiss these personnel in order to be considered for membership in those organizations. 14 Paradoxically, however, in the Foreign Intelligence Service's situation, those who worried about the retirement of the former Securitate personnel were SIE's partners. A former SIE director explained this by arguing that a relationship with a partner agency requires years and becomes personal, in that agents know each other very well and trust each other, 15 and any breach in such relationship may affect the effectiveness of cooperation.
Cooperation was strengthened after Romania started to undertake a more serious overhaul of its security and intelligence agencies (which led to NATO and EU membership), establish agreements of cooperation with counterparts abroad, and especially after Romania became an effective contributor with troops (including intelligence) to different peace operations and war on terror missions, together with foreign partners.
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation. All Romanian IC members have established specific intelligence sharing and exchange mechanisms with foreign partners, through various bilateral and multilateral channels, stemming from common preoccupations, needs and perceptions, as well as shared threats. Cooperation is ensured through information sharing, mutual support, visits and joint training. 
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Intelligence and National Security expressed his appreciation regarding the excellent work between the FBI office and Romanian intelligence and law enforcement organizations.
17
Romania has been part of the European Police Office (the EU's criminal intelligence agency) since 2004. As a member, Romania has participated in regular meetings with EUROPOL and facilitated information and intelligence sharing with the European Police Office on crime-related issues. 18 The 
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Romania is one of the few NATO members able to organize, prepare and deploy in operations theaters complex intelligence structures to include Human Intelligence (HUMINT), SIGINT, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), multisource analysis capabilities collections, and, as well, to ensure the specialized logistic support (specific communications, technical devices maintenance, and training and rotation of personnel). In 2003, the Special Detachment Iraq was established composed of a SIGINT structure conducting specialized/focused collection missions such as internal and external political environment, area leaders and their motivations/incentives, economic factors, cultural and religious factors, ethnic relations, organizations and institutions active in the region , police and paramilitary forces, terrorist groups and other organizations. In September 2005, the intelligence cell in Kandahar was completed by a SIGINT component for collection through radio monitoring of the terrorist groups in Afghanistan and its neighbors. 22 HUMINT capablities are highly desired within the Atlantic Alliance, and Romania is one of the few Allies possessing excellent HUMINT assets. In Iraq, for example, effective HUMINT collection by Coalition forces were possible due to the historical closeness between Romanian and Iraqi people, which made Iraqis more open to the Romanian troops than to the other Coalition forces. 23 Likewise, SPP officers ensure the protection of various UN officials in Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the SPP professionalism and expertise, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, Sir David Veness, was interested in establishing a center of excellence in Romania, in support of UN activities, which will have a training component, as well as a research and development component. 24 
Conclusion
Establishing a functional cooperation among intelligence agencies and other national security institutions has been problematic in many long established democracies: the United States' intelligence organizations have tried to do so since the early 1940s and France's agencies since early 1990s. Moreover, despite the reorganization in the United States after 9/11, many argue that the intelligence system is yet to become an effective community. 25 For Romania, such a process is even more difficult. As has been the case for intelligence reform in general, the evolution of interagency cooperation in Romania has been hampered by a series of challenges, including the legacy of the Securitate, bureaucratic obstacles, protracted scandals and rivalries among intelligence agencies, attempts to politicize intelligence, conflicts between political figures and the like. Of late, however, as the number of 'unknowns' in the global 'security equation' mounted, the intelligence agencies have understood they serve a common purpose -the security of the country and its citizens (even if, by law, they have different responsibilities). The creation of the controversial CNI, which appears to have raised more questions than answers with regard to interagency cooperation, in that there is no statutory law for it and it lacks transparency and accountability, seems to be serving its objective. Its supporters asserted that the CSAT's decision to create the CNI was the 'most important decision taken in the field of national security in the last fifteen years'. 26 Obviously, the establishment of such a community has been necessary for fair competition among services and to provide the decision makers with integrated intelligence briefs/products (which is actually happening, through the Office for Integrated Intelligence). Likewise, since the CSAT is the major intelligence consumer, creating the CNI within the Council made perfect sense. Even so, CNI needs an organic/statutory law approved by the parliament and needs to be under democratic control.
Asked in an interview in 2006 whether or not there still existed unfair competition among intelligence agencies in Romania, former SIE director Claudiu Saftoiu claimed that this was no longer the case. Likewise, the SPP director stated that the 'communication' between SPP and the other intelligence agencies had improved greatly since he took office.
27
At the international level, Romania's intelligence community has changed its status from a 'pariah' to a trustworthy ally, as shown by reiterated commendation of the professionalism and effectiveness of the Romanian IC by its international counterparts. The SPP, whose officers ensure the protection of UN officials in Sudan and Afghanistan has repeatedly received praise from the United Nations. 28 Likewise, SRI and SIE are viewed as among the most reliable and credible services by NATO, EU and other intelligence agencies.
In conclusion, Romania has made major strides in developing an effective intelligence system through, among other measures, the development of specific coordination and cooperation mechanisms; the Romanian IC's cooperative actions alongside national law enforcement institutions, judiciary and civil society, as well as with international intelligence systems, have proven that a 'one for all, all for one' approach matters when it comes to national, regional or global security.
